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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW–DRIVER’S
INTERPRETATION
LENTZ V. SPRYNCZNATYK

LICENSE

[VOL . 82:1033

SUSPENSION–STATUTORY

Aaron Lentz appealed a North Dakota Department of Transportation
officer’s decision to suspend his commercial driver’s license for ninety-nine
years when the officer considered Lentz’s past driving under the influence
(DUI) conviction in rendering the suspension.1 Lentz argued that a statute
permitting lifetime suspension of a commercial driver’s license should not
be used retroactively to consider a previous DUI offense that occurred prior
to the statute’s enactment.2 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the hearing officer, finding that the officer properly interpreted
the statute.3
Aaron Lentz acquired his commercial driver’s license in 1998.4 The
North Dakota Legislative Assembly enacted a statute, effective August 1,
2003, whereby a commercial driver’s license would be suspended for life
upon the accumulation of two DUI offenses.5 Lentz received his first DUI
conviction while driving a noncommercial vehicle on September 5, 2000.6
Lentz’s first conviction occurred prior to the statute’s enactment, but he
received a second DUI conviction on November 17, 2003, which was after
the statute’s enactment.7
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Lentz argued that the
statute was improperly applied because one of his DUI convictions
occurred before the statute’s enactment.8 Since the legal question posed on
review regarded the interpretation of a statute, the agency’s decision was
fully reviewable.9
First, the court noted that no North Dakota statute is retroactive “unless
it is expressly declared to be so.”10 Here, the statute became effective on
August 1, 2003, and provided that “for a second conviction of driving while
under the influence or being under the influence of a controlled substance or
refusal to be tested while operating a noncommercial motor vehicle, a
1. Lentz v. Spryncznatyk, 2006 ND 27, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d 859, 860.
2. Id. ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d at 860.
3. Id.
4. Id. ¶ 2
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. ¶ 5, 708 N.W.2d at 861.
9. Id. ¶ 4 (citing Bjerklie v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2005 ND 178, ¶ 9, 704 N.W.2d 818,
821).
10. Id. ¶ 6 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-10 (2005)).
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commercial driver’s license holder must be disqualified from operating a
commercial motor vehicle for life.”11 Based on this language, Lentz argued
that because his first DUI conviction occurred prior to the enactment of the
statute, the court should not consider his previous conviction.12 Instead,
Lentz claimed that his commercial driver’s license should only be suspended for one year.13 Furthermore, Lentz claimed that if his license was
suspended for longer than one year, then the legislature’s presumption
against retroactive statutes would be violated because the subsection did not
expressly contain retroactive language.14
However, based on two analogous decisions, the North Dakota
Supreme Court rejected Lentz’s argument and affirmed the holding.15 The
court indicated that “the enactment of a change of consequence in . . .
driving privileges d[oes] not amount to a retroactive application of [a]
statute.”16
The court examined an analogous decision, Rott v. North Dakota
Department of Transportation,17 where a minor accumulated six points
against her driving record for a single traffic violation, which resulted in the
suspension of her driver’s license.18 Rott claimed that she was licensed as a
class D driver for two years prior to the enactment of the applicable statute,
and when she received the traffic violation the statute was applied to her
retroactively because the status of her driver’s license changed.19 But the
court rejected Rott’s argument because a statute could only be labeled as
retroactive if it “operate[d] on transactions that have already occurred, or on
rights existing before its enactment.”20

11. Id. ¶ 7 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.2-10(8) (2005)).
12. Id. ¶ 8.
13. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.2-10(7) (2005)). N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.2-10(7)
states:
For a first conviction of driving while under the influence of alcohol or being under
the influence of a controlled substance or refusal to be tested while operating a noncommercial motor vehicle, a commercial driver’s license holder must be disqualified
from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one year.
Id.
14. Id. ¶ 9, 708 N.W.2d at 862.
15. Id. ¶ 9 (referencing Rott v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2000 ND 175, ¶ 10, 617 N.W.2d 475,
477; State v. Haverluk, 432 N.W.2d 871, 874 (N.D. 1988)).
16. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Rott, ¶ 12, 617 N.W.2d at 478).
17. 2000 ND 175, 617 N.W.2d 475.
18. Lentz, 2006 ND 27, ¶ 10, 708 N.W.2d 859, 862 (citing Rott, ¶ 2, 617 N.W.2d at 476).
The North Dakota Century Code section 39-06-01.1 provides that the accumulation of more than
five points against a minor’s driving record calls for the suspension of driving privileges. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-06-01.1 (2005).
19. Lentz, ¶ 10, 708 N.W.2d at 862.
20. Id. (citing Rott, ¶¶ 7, 10, 617 N.W.2d at 477).
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The court applied a similar rationale in another analogous decision,
State v. Haverluk,21 where it held that an increased penalty based on past
convictions was not an application of a retroactive statute.22 Haverluk had
three prior DUI convictions, and a statute provided for an increased penalty
for a fourth DUI conviction.23 On Haverluk’s fourth conviction, he argued
that because three of his DUI convictions occurred prior to the statute’s
enactment, the increased penalty could not be applied to him.24 But the
court found that because the triggering behavior occurred after the enactment of the statute, the increased penalty was not a retroactive application.25
Applying Rott and Haverluk, Lentz’s arguments failed.26 In affirming
the conviction and suspension of Lentz’s commercial driver’s license for
ninety-nine years, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that even though
Lentz’s first conviction occurred prior to the statute’s enactment, the statute
had not been applied retroactively.27 Furthermore, the court found additional support from neighboring state opinions, which upheld the use of
prior drunk driving convictions to increase penalties for subsequent DUI
offenses.28
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW–INTERSTATE WILDLIFE VIOLATOR COMPACT–
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
GRAY V . NORTH DAKOTA GAME & FISH DEP’T
David B. Gray, a North Dakota resident, was convicted of trespass to
hunt in Wyoming on April 16, 2004, in a Wyoming circuit court.29 Gray
had crossed private land with “No Hunting” and “No Trespassing” postings
in order to reach public land for hunting purposes.30 Following appeal to a
Wyoming district court, Gray’s conviction was upheld and he was banned

21. 432 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1988).
22. Lentz, ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d at 862 (citing State v. Haverluk, 432 N.W.2d 871, 873-74 (N.D.
1988)).
23. Id. ¶ 11.
24. Id. (citing Haverluk, 432 N.W.2d at 872-73) (showing that section 39-08-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that a “fourth or subsequent DUI conviction in a seven-year
period” would enhance the penalty to a class A misdemeanor).
25. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Haverluk, 432 N.W.2d at 873).
26. Id. ¶ 13, 708 N.W.2d at 863.
27. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
28. Id. (citing Sims v. State, 556 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Ark. 1977); State v. Sedillos, 112 P.3d
854, 856 (Kan. 2005); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Minn. 1983); Alexander v.
Commonwealth of Penn., Dep’t. of Transp., 880 A.2d 552, 561 (Pa. 2005)).
29. Gray v. N.D. Game & Fish Dep’t, 2005 ND 204, ¶ 2, 706 N.W.2d 614, 617.
30. Id. ¶ 2, 706 N.W.2d at 617.
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from hunting, fishing, and trapping in Wyoming until 2006.31 Because
Wyoming and North Dakota are members of the Interstate Wildlife Violator
Compact (hereinafter “Compact”), information regarding Gray’s suspended
hunting privileges was submitted to the North Dakota Game and Fish
Department (hereinafter “Department”) on October 12, 2004.32 Gray was
informed via letter that his North Dakota hunting privileges were similarly
suspended.33 Both an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) and,
on further appeal, the District Court of Burleigh County affirmed the
Department’s action.34 An appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court
followed thereafter.35
The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the ALJ in
the same manner as did the district court.36 The court decided only whether
a “reasoning mind reasonably could have decided the agency’s findings
were proven by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.”37
Similarly, the court did not make independent findings of fact, nor
substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ.38 Furthermore, the court
stated that if the ALJ’s findings were supported by a preponderance of the
evidence, then the ALJ’s order would be upheld.39 Thus, the court would
affirm the order of the ALJ unless any of the following were present:
1. The order [wa]s not in accordance with the law.
2. The order [wa]s in violation of the constitutional rights of the
appellant.
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in
the proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the
appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency [we]re not supported
by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency [we]re not
supported by its findings of fact.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4, 706 N.W.2d at 618
Id. ¶ 7 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-49 (2004)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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7. The findings of fact made by the agency d[id] not sufficiently
address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency d[id] not
sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any
contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.40
First, Gray argued that the Department should not have suspended his
North Dakota hunting privileges on the basis of the Wyoming trespass to
hunt conviction.41 Under the Compact, the “participating states agree to
honor other participating states’ wildlife license suspensions” to promote
proper wildlife resource management.42
[P]articipating states may recognize the suspension of license
privileges of any person by any participating state as though the
violation resulting in the suspension had occurred in their state and
could have been the basis for suspension of license privileges in
their state . . . [and] shall communicate suspension information to
other participating states in form and content as contained in the
compact manual.43
Therefore, after receiving notice of Gray’s suspension from Wyoming, the
Department had to determine if the violation could have led to a suspension
in North Dakota.44
In Wyoming, Gray was found guilty of violating a statute that
prohibited entering private land, without the owner’s permission, to hunt.45
North Dakota also imposes limits on hunting private land, such that “no
person may hunt or pursue game, or enter for those purposes, upon legally
posted land belonging to another without first obtaining the permission of
the person legally entitled to grant the same.”46 While North Dakota presumes that the hunting of private land is legal when the land is not legally
posted, Wyoming requires express permission from the landowner to
hunt.47 Gray contended that because the two statutes differed, his violation
in Wyoming could not be recognized in North Dakota.48

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. ¶ 6 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2004)).
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. at 619 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-16-01, art. 5, §§ 1-2 (2004)).
Id. ¶ 10, 706 N.W.2d at 619 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-16-03 (2004)).
Id. ¶ 11 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-305(b) (2005)).
Id. ¶ 12, 706 N.W.2d at 620 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-18 (2004)).
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-17 (2004)).
Id.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the Department
properly interpreted the law by suspending Gray’s hunting privileges.49
The court held that participating statutes need not be identical, as the
purpose of the Compact is to “promote compliance with the statutes . . . relating to management of wildlife resources.”50 The court noted that Gray’s
theory would strip the Compact of any real meaning because wildlife
statutes among the participating states are not identical.51 The court also
stated that had Gray’s actions taken place in North Dakota, his privileges
would have been similarly suspended.52 Finally, the court disposed of
Gray’s argument by claiming that the “No Trespassing” and “No Hunting”
signs posted on the Wyoming land did not conform to North Dakota’s
statute. The court held that the use of “technical requirements of North
Dakota law as a defense to reciprocal enforcement of the Wyoming conviction in North Dakota” did not clear Gray of his violation.53
Next, Gray argued that the Department erred by giving full faith and
credit to a Wyoming conviction that was wrongfully obtained.54 At trial,
the Wyoming court allowed an amendment of the criminal citation, and
Gray claimed that this amendment defeated his defense.55 The citation
listed an erroneous location as the place of the offense, and he stated as a
defense that he was innocent of the criminal citation with respect to that
location.56 But when the citation was amended to list the correct location of
the offense, Gray claimed that his defense was defeated.57 However, the
Wyoming district court stated that Gray’s brief recognized the citation’s
error prior to trial, and because of this acknowledgment, he was not prejudiced by the amended citation.58 Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme
Court followed the reasoning of the Wyoming district court and found that
there was no evidence of a due process violation or prejudice arising from
the amended criminal complaint, and therefore, the court held that it was
proper to give full faith and credit to Gray’s conviction.59
49. Id. ¶ 16, 706 N.W.2d at 621.
50. Id. ¶ 13, 706 N.W.2d at 620 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-16-01, art. 1, § 2(a)
(2004)).
51. Id.
52. Id. ¶ 15, 706 N.W.2d at 621.
53. Id.
54. Id. ¶ 17.
55. Id. ¶ 19.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. (citing State v. Higgins, 2004 ND 115, ¶ 5, 680 N.W.2d 645, 647) (stating that the
trial court has discretion to amend a criminal complaint if the amendment does not prejudice the
defendant).
59. Id.
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Gray then claimed the Compact violated the compact clause of the
Unites States Constitution because “no state shall, without the consent of
Congress . . . enter into any . . . compact with another state.”60 The Department first claimed that the states had previously been allowed to enter
compacts “for . . . mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the
enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies.”61 In addition,
the Department argued that the United States Supreme Court had already
settled the question of when interstate agreements fell within the compact
clause:62
When an agreement between states is not directed to the formation
of any combination tending to increase the political power in the
states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the supremacy
of the United States, the agreement does not fall within the scope
of the compact clause and will not be invalidated for lack of
congressional consent.63
Furthermore, the Department noted that the Compact was similar to the
Drivers License Compact and Non-Resident Violator Compact, both of
which specifically related to the licensing and enforcement of automobile
drivers, and as a result, both were found to be outside the scope of the
compact clause.64
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that “[p]rotection of the
wildlife of the State is peculiarly within the police power, and the State has
great latitude in determining what means are appropriate for its protection.”65 The court found that the Compact’s system of information sharing
and enforcement of wildlife violations did not intrude on the United States’
supremacy, and therefore, the Compact did not require Congressional
consent.66
Gray then claimed that the Department’s suspension of his hunting
privileges, based on the Wyoming conviction, violated double jeopardy

60. Id. ¶ 20 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10).
61. Id. ¶ 21, 706 N.W.2d at 621-22 (citing 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2005) (providing that
congressional consent is granted under such circumstances)).
62. Id. at 622.
63. Id. (citting Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 175-76 (1985)).
64. Id. (citing Koterba v. Commonwealth of Penn. Dep’t of Transp., 736 A.2d 761, 765-66
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (explaining that the Driver’s License Compact is an interstate agreement
which does not need “Congressional approval” because its policy does not threaten the supremacy
of the United States and no state has acted beyond its granted powers through its association in the
Driver’s License Compact)).
65. Id. ¶ 22 (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 391 (1978)).
66. Id.
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principles.67 Gray argued that North Dakota’s suspension of his license was
a successive punishment for the same crime.68 The court stated that the
Drivers License Compact, which suspended the driving privileges of violators, had been held as a legitimate civil remedial sanction that did not
violate double jeopardy principles.69 Because the Compact was held in a
comparable light to the Drivers License Compact, the court held that the
Department’s suspension of Gray’s hunting privileges was “a legitimate
civil remedial measure that serves the goal of protecting wildlife resources
as well as the safety of persons and property . . . .”70 Therefore, the Department’s suspension of Gray’s hunting privileges did not violate double
jeopardy.71
Next, Gray argued that his procedural due process rights had been
violated by the Department because he was not provided with notice and
hearing before suspension.72 The court’s analysis balanced Gray’s right for
procedural fairness against the government’s competing interests.73 In past
decisions, the court has held that pre-suspension hearings were not necessary to meet due process requirements where a driver’s license suspension
was a private concern because the protection of public interest outweighed
the need for a pre-suspension hearing.74 The court noted an Ohio Supreme
Court case, City of Maumee v. Gabriel,75 which held that an individual does
not have a substantial private interest to possess a driver’s license because
the state has an interest to provide a safe environment for the public, and
once the state removes drivers who fail to meet the state’s laws and regulations, due process requirements are satisfied.76
Analogizing these previous holdings in the context of the Compact, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the State’s interest in enforcing and
complying with wildlife hunting laws outweighed Gray’s hunting privileges.77 Furthermore, the court concluded that Gray’s due process rights

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
862).
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 24, 706 N.W.2d at 623 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
Id. ¶ 25 (citing Marshall v. Dep’t of Transp., 48 P.3d 666, 671 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002)).
Id. ¶ 26.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27, 706 N.W.2d at 624.
Id. ¶ 28 (citing Wahl v. Morton County Soc. Servs., 1998 ND 48, ¶ 6, 574 N.W.2d 859,
Id. ¶ 29 (citing State v. Harm, 200 N.W.2d 387, 388 (N.D. 1972).
518 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio 1988).
Gray, ¶ 29, 706 N.W.2d at 624 (citing City of Maumee, 518 N.E.2d at 562 (Ohio 1988)).
Id. ¶ 30.
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were not violated when the trial court suspended his hunting privileges
without first providing him pre-suspension notice and hearing.78
Next, Gray asserted that his equal protection rights had been violated
by the changes that the North Dakota Legislative Assembly made to the
language of the Compact.79 Gray argued that North Dakota gave the
Department the discretion to punish violators with suspensions when it
changed the language in the Compact from “shall” to “may.”80 Therefore,
the court analyzed Gray’s equal protection challenge as a selective prosecution challenge.81 But the court quickly noted that selective enforcement or
prosecution, without improper motives, does not violate equal protection.82
Because Gray failed to establish that “other similarly situated individuals
have not had their hunting privileges suspended,” the court concluded that
his equal protection rights were not violated by either the Department’s
action or by the changes that the legislature made with respect to the
Compact’s wording.83
Finally, Gray argued that the Compact was an unconstitutional ex post
facto law.84 The court explained that an ex post facto law is “one that
makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal.”85 Looking to the facts of the case, the North
Dakota Legislative Assembly enacted the Compact in 2001, and Gray was
convicted in Wyoming in 2004.86 Consequently, the court dismissed
Gray’s ex post facto argument because North Dakota’s law wasn’t passed
after his conviction, and the court found all other contentions without
merit.87 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the ALJ.88
In a special concurrence, Chief Justice VandeWalle noted his
uneasiness with North Dakota’s version of the Compact.89 Chief Justice

78. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-16-05(1) (2004) (stating that a prompt postsuspension hearing will be provided upon request of the violator)).
79. Id. ¶ 31, 706 N.W.2d at 624-25.
80. Id.
81. Id. ¶ 32, 706 N.W.2d at 625.
82. Id. (citing Gale v. N.D. Bd. of Podiatric Med., 1997 ND 83, ¶ 32, 562 N.W.2d 878, 886).
83. Id. ¶ 32-33 (citing State v. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d 129, 133 (N.D. 1984) (holding that a
defendant claiming selective prosecution must establish other similarly situated individuals have
not been prosecuted and the prosecution of the defendant is based upon constitutionally
impermissible considerations)).
84. Id. ¶ 34.
85. Id. ¶ 35 (citing State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 10, 598 N.W.2d 147, 152).
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 35-36.
88. Id. ¶ 36.
89. Id. ¶ 38.
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VandeWalle cautioned that the legislature’s grant of discretion to the
Department may have been well intended, but it left open the possibility for
a later defendant to successfully argue that an improper selective prosecution or an inappropriate delegation of legislative power has occurred.90
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW–INTOXILYZER TEST & ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL–
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
ERIKSMOEN V. N.D. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
In Eriksmoen v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,91
Kjerstin Eriksmoen appealed from a district court judgment affirming a
three-year revocation of her driver’s license for refusing to submit to an
intoxilyzer test.92 Eriksmoen argued that she had been denied an “adequate
opportunity to consult with her attorney” prior to refusing the intoxilyzer
test.93 Under North Dakota law, a person arrested for driving under the
influence has a “limited statutory right . . . to consult with counsel before
deciding whether to submit to a chemical test.”94
Highway Patrol Officer Troy Hischer noticed Eriksmoen’s car when
the vehicle was in the right-turn-only lane with its right turn signal on, but
turned left onto 32nd Avenue.95 After stopping the car, Hischer walked to
the car, smelled the odor of alcohol on Eriksmoen’s breath, and noticed a
case of beer in the car’s back seat.96 Eriksmoen admitted to drinking earlier
at a wedding reception, so Hischer administered a field sobriety test on
her.97 Upon failing the field sobriety test, Eriksmoen was read the implied
consent advisory and asked to take the onsite screening test (SD-2 test) by
giving a breath sample.98 She refused to provide a breath sample before
speaking with her attorney.99 So Eriksmoen was arrested for driving-underthe-influence (DUI) and escorted to the Grand Forks Police Department.100
Upon arriving at the Grand Forks Police Department, Eriksmoen was

90. Id.
91. 2005 ND 206, 706 N.W.2d 610.
92. Eriksmoen, ¶ 1, 706 N.W.2d at 611.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶ 8, 706 N.W.2d at 612 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-05-20 (2005)).
95. Id. ¶ 2, 706 N.W.2d at 611.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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allowed to make a cellular phone call to her attorney’s son, and thereafter
submitted a breath sample for the SD-2 test, failing this test as well.101
While in the intoxilyzer room at the Grand Forks Police Department,
Eriksmoen was again read the implied consent advisory and asked to take
an intoxilyzer test.102 Before answering, she requested another phone call
to her attorney, but this proved unnecessary because her attorney had already arrived at the police station.103
Eriksmoen’s attorney, Henry Howe, requested a private room to meet
with his client.104 However, Hischer was required to maintain supervision
of Eriksmoen, and because no observational room was available at the time,
Hischer offered to stand at the end of the intoxilyzer room and remain out
of earshot.105 But Howe refused to consult with his client under such circumstances, as Hischer was standing a mere twenty-one feet away and did
not prevent other officers from walking through the room.106 Howe left the
station without advising Eriksmoen on whether to submit to the intoxilyzer
test, so she refused to take the test.107
A hearing officer found that Eriksmoen had not been deprived of her
statutory right to consult counsel.108 A district judge affirmed.109
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Eriksmoen’s main
argument was that she was denied a reasonable opportunity to meet with
her attorney in a meaningful way.110 In reviewing Eriksmoen’s claim, the
North Dakota Supreme Court explained that deference must be given to the
Department’s finding when evaluating a driver’s license suspension.111 The
court had to determine “only whether a reasoning mind could have concluded the Department’s findings were supported by the weight of the
evidence from the entire record.”112 Therefore, the court would not reverse
the agency’s findings unless:
1. The order is not in accordance with the law.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 706 N.W.2d at 611.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 706 N.W.2d at 612.
Id. ¶ 7 (citing Lee v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2004 ND 7, ¶ 9, 673 N.W.2d 245, 248).
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2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the
appellant.
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in
the proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the
appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not
supported by its findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently
address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not
sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any
contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an
administrative law judge.113
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that an accused has only
a “limited statutory right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to
submit to a chemical test.”114 To determine whether Eriksmoen’s right to
consult with counsel had been violated, the court relied on a balancing
test.115 “[F]ailure to allow the arrested person a reasonable opportunity to
contact an attorney prevents the revocation of her license for refusal to take
the test.”116 The court explained that the reasonableness of the opportunity
to meet with an attorney must be viewed objectively under the totality of
the circumstances.117
Relying on Bickler v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner,118
Eriksmoen argued that she had a right to consult with her attorney in a
private room.119 Eriksmoen asserted that a private room was necessary for
attorney-client consultation so that she could speak with her attorney freely

113. Id. ¶ 6 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46).
114. Id. ¶ 8.
115. Id. ¶ 9 (“The arrestee’s right to consult privately with counsel must be balanced against
society’s strong interest in obtaining important evidence.” (quoting Wetzel v. N.D. Dep’t of
Transp., 2001 ND 35, ¶ 12, 622 N.W.2d 180, 183)).
116. Id. ¶ 9.
117. Id.
118. 423 N.W.2d 146 (N.D. 1988).
119. Eriksmoen, ¶ 10, 706 N.W.2d at 612-13 (citing Bickler v. N.D. State Highway Comm’r,
423 N.W.2d 146, 148 (N.D. 1988)).
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and openly to prevent police from being within earshot.120 However, the
court noted that Bickler did not require a private room for attorney-client
discussions.121 Instead, Bickler stood for the proposition that “when an
arrested person asks to consult with counsel before electing to take a
chemical test he must be given the opportunity to do so out of police
hearing, and law enforcement must establish that such opportunity was
provided.”122 Therefore, Bickler required that police be out of earshot of
the client-attorney discussion, not that a private room be provided.123
Even though Bickler was factually similar, it did not support
Eriksmoen’s argument.124 The court found that Eriksmoen was provided a
room that, although not private, was reasonable and adequate for
consultation with her attorney to discuss the legal situation prior to refusing
the intoxilyzer test.125 In addition, the court noted that a specific room
length was not a proper gauge for whether Eriksmoen had a reasonable
opportunity to consult with her attorney.126 The court found that even if
police officers had overheard her conversation with Howe, such testimony
by the officers would have been inadmissible.127 Therefore, Eriksmoen’s
attorney could have consulted with her regarding whether she should
submit to the intoxilyzer test without such information being used against
her.128 Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the agency’s holding that Eriksmoen had a
reasonable opportunity to consult with her attorney.129

CIVIL PROCEDURE—AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS BY CONSENT
RUUD V. FRANDSON
Dan Frandson appealed a declaratory judgment of the District Court of
Ward County.130 The district court held that Frandson did not farm the
cropland that he inherited under his mother’s will, which contained a clause
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. ¶ 12, 706 N.W.2d at 613.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. (citing Bickler, 423 N.W.2d at 148).
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id.
Ruud v. Frandson, 2005 ND 174, ¶ 1, 704 N.W.2d 852, 854.
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that provided an option for his sister, Karen Ruud, to purchase the land.131
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.132
Alice Frandson died testate in 1987, leaving in her will certain parcels
of property to her son, Dan Frandson, with the following condition:
In the event that Dan chooses not to farm any or all of the cropland
during a twenty (20) year period following my death, then my
daughters, together or separately, shall have the option to purchase
any portion of that cropland at a price of $80.00 per acre through
1991, and at one-third of its appraised value if purchased after
1991, with all of the proceeds to go to my beloved son, Dan.133
Upon his mother’s death, Frandson lived and worked on the cropland
until 1991.134 In January 1991, Frandson left the farm and moved to Idaho,
where he remained until returning to North Dakota in February of 1993. 135
When Frandson was away, he entered into a one-year crop share agreement
with a third party for the years of 1991 and 1992.136 Upon Frandson’s
return, he physically farmed the land until June of 1998.137 In 1998,
Frandson and his wife attempted to secure an operating loan to update the
farm machinery.138 When the loan was denied, Frandson entered into a
crop-share agreement with his nephew, Jeffery Ruud, for the 1998 crop
year.139 This lease was to run through the conclusion of the twenty-year
clause in Alice Frandson’s will.140 The parties then entered into the lease,
and Frandson sold much of the farm equipment to Jeffery Ruud.141
Frandson moved back to Idaho.142
On September 25, 2002, Karen Ruud hired an attorney to exercise her
option to purchase the cropland based on the clause in the will.143 Frandson
refused to recognize Karen Ruud’s efforts as a valid exercise of her option,
and Karen Ruud commenced an action.144 The trial court found that the

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
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mother’s intent was for Frandson to physically farm the land, and the court
ordered Frandson to sell the cropland to Karen Ruud.145
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Frandson argued that
the trial court was clearly erroneous in its findings.146 In addition, Frandson
argued that even though he did not raise the issue of waiver and estoppel in
the pleadings, or amend the pleadings, these claims were impliedly tried
through the introduction of evidence at trial.147
Applying the “clearly erroneous” standard of review, the North Dakota
Supreme Court noted that the mother intended Frandson to physically farm
the land.148 Therefore, the court held that the trial court’s findings were not
clearly erroneous.149
Next, Frandson argued that Karen Ruud waived her rights through
implied consent.150 Specifically, Frandson argued that Karen Ruud failed to
notify him that he was not complying with the condition placed upon his
ownership in the will.151 Because Karen Ruud failed to notify Frandson, he
claimed that she waived her rights through implied consent.152 However,
the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the issues of waiver and
implied consent were not properly pled at trial.153
For an effective appeal on a proper issue, the issue must have been
raised at trial.154 If an issue is not pled, pleadings can be amended to
conform to the evidence raised at trial.155 Under Rule 15(b) of the North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, “a pleading may be impliedly amended by
the introduction of evidence which varies the theory of the case and which
is not objected to on the grounds it is not within the issues in the pleadings.”156 But amendment by implication may only occur when the evidence
that is introduced is not relevant to any issue in the case.157 When the

145. Id.
146. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Ruud v. Frandson, 2005 ND 174, 704 N.W.2d 852 (No.
20050049).
147. Frandson, ¶ 10, 704 N.W.2d at 855.
148. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 704 N.W.2d at 855.
149. Id. ¶ 9.
150. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 704 N.W.2d at 855-56.
151. Id. ¶ 12, 704 N.W.2d at 856.
152. Id.
153. Id. ¶ 13, 704 N.W.2d at 857.
154. Id. ¶ 10, 704 N.W.2d at 855. (citing Kautzman v. Kautzman, 2003 ND 140, ¶ 10, 668
N.W.2d 59, 64).
155. Id. (citing Tormaschy v. Tormaschy, 1997 ND 2, ¶ 17, 559 N.W.2d 813, 817).
156. Id. (quoting Lochthowe v. C.F. Peterson Estate, 2005 ND 40, ¶ 8, 692 N.W.2d 120,
123).
157. Id. ¶ 10, 704 N.W.2d at 856.
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evidence is relevant to an issue raised in the pleadings, then the pleadings
may not be impliedly amended.158 Furthermore, the court has stated:
When the evidence that is claimed to show that an issue was tried
by consent is relevant to an issue already in the case, as well as to
the one that is the subject matter of the amendment, and there was
no indication at trial that the party who introduced the evidence
was seeking to raise a new issue, the pleadings will not be deemed
amended under the first portion of Rule 15(b). The reasoning
behind this view is sound since if evidence is introduced to support
basic issues that already have been pleaded, the opposing party
may not be conscious of its relevance to issues not raised by the
pleadings unless that fact is specifically brought to his attention.159
Frandson did not raise the issues of waiver and estoppel in the
pleadings, nor in an amendment to the pleadings.160 Additionally, Frandson
did not present any evidence during trial that would warn Karen Ruud that
he intended to include waiver and estoppel, and instead he waited until his
post-trial brief was filed to raise those issues.161 However, Frandson argued
that his attorney’s questioning, regarding Karen Ruud’s failure to notify
Frandson that he was violating the will’s stipulations, and Ruud’s involvement in the lease negotiations between Frandson and Jeffrey Ruud were
enough to bring waiver and estoppel arguments into the pleadings by
implication.162
Disagreeing with Frandson’s arguments, the North Dakota Supreme
Court stated that Karen Ruud did not impliedly consent to a trial involving
waiver and estoppel.163 The court found that although the lawyer’s
questions relating to notice were relevant in determining if Frandson was
complying with the will’s stipulations, such questions were not enough to
put Karen Ruud on notice that he was expanding his claims to include
waiver and estoppel.164 Additionally, the questions relating to the lease
agreements were relevant only as to whether Frandson was farming the land
in compliance with the will provision.165 But these questions did not notify
Karen Ruud or the trial court that Frandson was expanding his theory to

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. (quoting Mann v. Zabolotny, 2000 ND 160, ¶ 12, 615 N.W.2d 526, 529-30).
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 704 N.W.2d at 856-57.
Id. ¶13, 704 N.W.2d at 857.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
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include estoppel.166 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that
the lack of notification to Karen Ruud or the trial court regarding the
expansion of Frandson’s case, to include theories of waiver and estoppel,
did not allow for an amendment of the pleadings by consent.167
CIVIL PROCEDURE—DEFAULT JUDGMENT—DISCRETION OF THE COURT
SCHWAN V. FOLDEN
Following a trial on the merits, the district court entered a motion for
default judgment against Paul Folden.168 Folden appealed the default judgment entered against him.169 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
and remanded for a judgment to be entered on the merits, rather than on
judgment.170
In North Dakota, the district court’s decision to grant a default
judgment will be affirmed unless an abuse of discretion has occurred.171 A
court abuses its discretion when it “acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable manner, or when it misinterprets or misapplies the law.”172
In determining whether the request for default judgment was proper, Rule
55(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
If a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise appear and the fact is made to
appear by affidavit or otherwise, the court may direct the clerk to
enter an appropriate judgment by default in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant.173
However, in countering Rule 55(a), the court noted that “if a plaintiff
does not move for default judgment after the default has accrued or within a
reasonable time after the default has accrued, and the answer is subsequently filed, then the plaintiff waives its right to default judgment for a
defendant’s failure to appear.”174 The court continued by explaining that an

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Schwan v. Folden, 2006 ND 28, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d 863, 864.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. ¶ 6, 708 N.W.2d at 865 (citing Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Reikowski, 2005
ND 133, ¶ 6, 699 N.W.2d 851, 853).
172. Id.
173. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting N.D.R.CIV.P. 55(a) (2005)).
174. Id. (citing United Accounts, Inc. v. Lantz, 145 N.W.2d 488, 491 (N.D. 1966)).
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entry of default judgment is a privilege the plaintiff may choose to apply.175
The court took special notice of other jurisdictions holding that waiver of a
default judgment will occur if the plaintiff proceeds to a trial on the merits
without fully exercising its default judgment privileges.176
In reversing the grant of Plaintiff Schwan’s motion for default
judgment, the court reaffirmed its strong preference for cases to be decided
on their merits.177 The court stated, “It is illogical to proceed with trial,
hear evidence from each party, and expend judicial resources, only to
decide the case with a default judgment.”178 Here, counsel for Schwan
initially raised a motion for default judgment but proceeded to trial.179
Because Schwan proceeded with trial, he presented evidence to the district
court so that a decision could be made on the merits of the case.180 Consequently, the court noted that Schwan extinguished his motion for a default
judgment by proceeding to trial.181 Therefore, the court held that because
Schwan could no longer invoke his privilege for default judgment, the district court abused its discretion in failing to decide the case on its merits.182
Before closing its opinion, the court stated that generally costs would
be taxed to the appellee due to the reversal.183 However, because Folden’s
counsel included items that were not in the record before the district court,
it violated Rule 32 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure.184
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied payment of all costs by
the appellee, Schwan.185

175. Id. (citing 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 203 (1955) (explaining that the default judgment
option may be waived by the plaintiff’s proceeding with the action, unless the plaintiff was
ignorant of the default at the time).
176. Id. ¶ 8 (citing Ewing v. Johnston, 334 S.E.2d 703, 707 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that
“[f]acts which have been held to constitute waiver include . . . going to trial on the merits, or
announcing ready for trial and introducing evidence on the merits.”); Johnson v. Gib’s W.
Kitchen, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1983) (holding that “the court did not abuse its
discretion in overruling plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment made during trial at the close of
plaintiff’s case”); Kuykendall v. Circle, Inc., 539 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
that “Kuykendall, having proceeded to trial on the merits without confirming his preliminary
default, waived his right to a default judgment”)).
177. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Filler v. Bragg, 1997 ND 24, ¶ 14, 559 N.W.2d 225, 229).
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 10.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. ¶ 12 (citing N.D.R.APP.P. 39(a)(3) (2005)).
184. Id.
185. Id. ¶¶ 12-13 (citing N.D.R.APP.P. 13 (2005)). Rule 13 of the North Dakota Rules of
Appellate Procedure states that “the supreme court may take appropriate action against any person
failing to perform an act required by rule or court order.” N.D.R.APP.P. 13 (2005)
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CRIMINAL LAW
STATE V. BERTRAM
In State v. Bertram,186 Randy Bertram appealed from a district court
jury verdict finding him guilty of violating a disorderly conduct restraining
order, criminal trespass, and contact by bodily fluids. The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed.187
On January 16, 2004, a divorce decree between Joan and Randy
Bertram awarded Joan the parties’ residence.188 On January 29, 2004, Joan
obtained a temporary disorderly conduct restraining order against Randy.189
On February 8, 2004, Randy entered Joan’s residence through a window
and spoke with her in violation of the restraining order.190 In defense,
Randy stated that he was attempting to retrieve his construction business’s
tax records, which were located in the residence.191
Randy was charged with a variety of offenses related to his actions of
entering the home and violating the restraining order.192 While Randy was
in custody, a correctional officer attempted to administer medication to
Randy, and Randy responded by spitting on the officer.193 Because the
officer was acting within the scope of his employment in administering
medication to Randy, Randy was charged with contact by bodily fluids
under section 12.1-17-11(1)(b)(3) of the North Dakota Century Code.194 In
September 2004 and October 2004, Randy was convicted by a jury of
violating a restraining order and contact by bodily fluids.195
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Randy argued that the
district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal
based on lack of evidence.196 Randy argued that the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was neither licensed nor privileged to

186. 2006 ND 10, 708 N.W.2d 913.
187. Bertram, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d at 917.
188. Id. ¶ 2.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. ¶ 3 (explaining that the actual criminal violations were: (1) violating the disorderly
conduct restraining order under North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-31.2-01; (2) for
allegedly entering Joan’s home and speaking to her and with criminal trespass under North Dakota
Century Code section 12.1-22-03(1) for allegedly entering her home, knowing he was not licensed
or privileged to be in the home).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. ¶ 4, 708 N.W.2d at 917-18.
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enter the home.197 But the evidence showed that Randy was provided with
the default divorce decree, which awarded Joan the parties’ home.198 In
addition, Joan informed Randy that he was not allowed to enter the home
unless she approved, so she changed the locks.199
The court applied the standard set out in State v. Noorlun,200 to
determine whether Randy’s conviction was based on sufficient evidence.201
In Noorlun, the court stated,
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we look
only to the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to
the verdict to ascertain if there is substantial evidence to warrant
the conviction. A conviction rests upon insufficient evidence only
when, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and giving the prosecution the benefit of all
inferences reasonably to be drawn in its favor, no rational fact
finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.202
Based on the trial court’s findings and the standard of review set out in
Noorlun, the court found that “the evidence and reasonable inferences from
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, are such that
a rational fact finder could find Randy knew he was not licensed or
privileged to enter Joan’s house.”203 Therefore, the conviction for criminal
trespass was affirmed.204
Randy’s second argument on appeal was that he was prosecuted
simultaneously for the same offense when charged with criminal trespass
and violation of the disorderly conduct restraining order.205 Randy claimed
that such simultaneous prosecutions were in violation of his state and
federal double jeopardy protections.206 In order to determine whether
criminal trespass and violation of the disorderly conduct restraining order
were the same offenses, the court applied the “same elements” test.207 The
“same elements” test requires the court to determine “whether each offense

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. ¶ 8, 708 N.W.2d at 918.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 9, 708 N.W.2d at 918-19.
2005 ND 189, 705 N.W.2d 819.
Bertram, ¶ 5, 708 N.W.2d at 918.
Id. (quoting State v. Noorlun, 2005 ND 189, ¶ 20, 705 N.W.2d 819, 826-27).
Id. ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d at 919.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id.
Id. ¶ 14.

1054

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 82:1033

contain[ed] an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same
offense’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive
prosecution.”208 Here, the criminal trespass charge required proof that
Randy entered or remained in a dwelling knowing he was not licensed or
privileged to be in that dwelling, and the disorderly conduct restraining
order charge required an additional element of proof that Randy knew of the
restraining order.209 Upon applying the “same elements” test, the court
found that the two offenses contained different elements, and therefore,
Randy’s double jeopardy protections were not violated.210
Randy’s third argument on appeal was that the trial court failed to
instruct the jury that “willful” culpability was required to prove a violation
of the disorderly conduct restraining order.211 The court stated that in order
for Randy to succeed on this argument, the district court’s jury instruction
must have been in obvious error in “clear deviation from an applicable legal
rule under current law.”212 But Randy did not object to this issue at trial.213
Furthermore, the jury instructions included the essential elements of the
offense based on section 12.1-31.2-01(8) of the North Dakota Century
Code.214 Therefore, the court rejected Randy’s argument and concluded
that the district court’s jury instruction on the violation of the disorderly
conduct restraining order was not in error.215
Randy also argued that reversal is required because the state failed to
allege all of the essential elements of contact by bodily fluids in the
amended documents.216 In the amended documents, the state failed to
include the words, “unless the employee does an act within the scope of
employment which requires or causes the contact.”217 Consequently, the
court has held that an information must be a written statement that contains
the essential elements of the offense.218 Furthermore, the North Dakota
Supreme Court relied on State v. Franfurth,219 which stated that “elements
of an offense” means: “(1) the forbidden conduct, (2) the attendant
circumstances specified in the definition and grading of the offense, (3) the

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. (quoting City of Fargo v. Hector, 534 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D. 1995)).
Id. ¶ 15, 708 N.W.2d at 920.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17 (quoting State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 14, 575 N.W.2d 658, 663).
Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
Id. ¶¶ 17-20.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 21, 708 N.W.2d at 921.
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-11(1)(b) (2005)).
Id. ¶ 23 (citing State v. Frankfurth, 2005 ND 167, ¶ 7, 704 N.W.2d 564, 566.
2005 ND 167, 704 N.W.2d 564.
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required culpability, (4) any required result, and (5) the nonexistence of a
defense as to which there is evidence sufficient to give rise to a reasonable
doubt on the issue.”220
Additionally, the court stated that technical defects would be dismissed
if the defendant had sufficient notice to prepare his defense.221 Here, the
applicable statute allowed for liability of bodily fluids when the victim
(officer) of the contact of bodily fluids was “acting in the scope of
employment,” but if the victim (officer) was acting “within the scope of
employment,” then the victim (officer) was precluded recovery.222 Therefore, Randy contended that if his bodily fluids came into contact with the
correctional officer, then it was a result of the officer acting in the course of
his employment.223 But the court found that Deputy Anderson, the victim,
was administering medication when Randy spit on him.224 Thus, the court
stated that the omission of the language “in” or “within” was not a technical
defect, and therefore, Randy’s defense was negated.225
The court refused to expand Frankfurth beyond the factual circumstances of that case.226 While in Frankfurth, the defendant claimed that the
information failed to allege his “knowledge” of the crime and he did not
raise this defense until post-trial, Randy did not wait until post-trial to raise
his defense as to the wording in the charging document, and instead raised
it during the trial.227 Therefore, instead of applying Frankfurth, the court
applied the “harmless error” analysis.228 Because there was a lack of evidence to support Randy’s assertion that he relied on the charging document
to his detriment, the court determined that the defect in the charging
document was harmless.229
Randy’s appeal included arguments of reversible errors because of
prosecutorial misstatements, a failure of the district court to inform counsel
in writing of a jury instruction, and ineffective assistance of counsel.230 The
court quickly dismissed these arguments on grounds that Randy’s
220. Bertram, ¶ 23, 708 N.W.2d at 922 (citing Frankfurth, ¶ 6, 704 N.W.2d at 566).
221. Id.
222. Id. ¶ 27, 708 N.W.2d at 923 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-11(1)(a)-(b) (2005))
(emphasis added).
223. Id. ¶ 28.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. ¶ 29.
227. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
228. Id. ¶¶ 30-31, 708 N.W.2d at 923-24 (providing the relevant text of rule 52(a) of the
N.D.R.CRIM.P., “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded”).
229. Id. ¶ 32, 708 N.W.2d at 924.
230. Id. ¶¶ 33-41, 708 N.W.2d at 924-26
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substantial rights were not affected, and therefore, his claims were
unsubstantiated.231
In conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied all of Randy’s
arguments on appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.232
CRIMINAL LAW—PLEAS
STATE V. FEIST
In State v. Feist,233 Douglas Feist appealed from a criminal judgment
that was entered after he pled guilty to possession of a pipe bomb.234 The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the conviction because: (1) the
district court failed to comply with Rule 11(c) of the North Dakota Rules of
Civil Procedure; and (2) the record demonstrated a lack of understanding
over what type of plea agreement existed.235
Andrew Greff and Feist decided to make a bomb and detonate it south
of Bismarck.236 When the bomb failed to detonate, Feist convinced Greff to
leave the bomb at the site.237 Greff took Feist home and then went back to
the site.238 Greff ignited the bomb, and the explosion severed his arm,
which was later amputated.239 Feist was arrested when the receipts for the
materials of the pipe bomb connected him to its construction.240
On August 18, 2004, Feist pled guilty to the charge of possession of a
pipe bomb.241 When the district court judge asked him for his plea, the
court failed to ask if a plea agreement existed.242 At a March 22, 2005,
sentencing hearing, Feist contended that he had entered a plea agreement
with the State’s Attorney, who was unable to attend court that day.243 On
March 30, 2005, after dealing with an unrelated matter regarding another
offense by Feist, the court inquired as to the existence of a plea agreement.244 After some discussion, the State’s Attorney requested a sentence
231. Id. ¶¶ 41-43, 708 N.W.2d at 926.
232. Id. ¶ 43.
233. 2006 ND 21, 708 N.W.2d 870.
234. Feist, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d at 872 (explaining that this is an illegal act under North Dakota
Century Code section 62.1-05-01).
235. Id.
236. Id. ¶ 2.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. ¶ 3.
240. Id. ¶ 4.
241. Id. ¶ 5.
242. Id. ¶ 6.
243. Id. ¶ 7, 708 N.W.2d at 872-73.
244. Id. ¶ 9, 708 N.W.2d at 873.
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of two years, with all but six months suspended.245 The district court
rejected the plea agreement, and Feist requested a jury trial.246
On April 13, 2005, a written order was issued stating the circumstances
and the confusion regarding the plea agreement.247 The written order stated
that the parties originally denied the existence of a plea agreement on the
issue of Feist’s possession of a pipe bomb and later agreed that an agreement did exist.248
On May 2, 2005, the State’s Attorney denied any existence of a plea
agreement, while Feist requested a withdrawal of his guilty plea.249 The
judge denied Feist’s motion and sentenced him to five years, while his codefendant, the one who actually ignited the bomb, was sentenced to six
months.250
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Feist argued that the
district court must withdraw his guilty plea due to the existence of his
binding plea agreement with the State’s Attorney.251 However, the State
argued that no binding plea existed, and instead, the State asserted that the
parties agreed to a non-binding sentencing recommendation.252 Furthermore, the State argued that if a plea agreement had existed, it would have
been stated when Feist first admitted guilt.253
Under State v. Thompson,254 if the parties agree to a non-binding
recommendation, the State’s obligation is fulfilled when it presents that
recommendation to the court.255 Furthermore, Thompson stood for the
proposition that the court may impose a harsher sentence than recommended by the State without allowing the defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea.256 Therefore, when a court is presented with a binding plea agreement, the court can accept the agreement, reject the agreement, or defer its
decision until receiving a pre-sentence report.257

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
1993)).
256.
257.

Id. ¶ 10, 708 N.W.2d at 873-74.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d at 874
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15, 708 N.W.2d at 874-75.
Id.
504 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1993).
Feist, ¶ 16, 708 N.W.2d at 875 (citing State v. Thompson, 504 N.W.2d 315, 319 (N.D.
Id. (citing Thompson, 504 N.W.2d at 319).
Id. (citing N.D.R.CRIM.P. 11(d)(2) (2002).
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Here, the record was unclear as to whether a plea agreement existed on
Feist’s charge of possession of a pipe bomb.258 The confusion was illustrated by: (1) contradictory statements made by the State’s Attorney; and
(2) the district court judge instructing the parties that he rejected the plea
agreement.259 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that when plea
agreements are ambiguous, a trial court should clarify the problem on the
record.260 In this case, the trial court did not attempt to determine the true
nature of the agreement on the record, so the supreme court had to determine whether the withdrawal of the guilty plea was necessary to prevent
injustice.261
A court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any time if
the defendant can prove that the withdrawal is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.262 The determination of whether a manifest injustice has
occurred is left to the district court to decide and will be reversed only on
appeal in abuse of discretion.263 Historically, the court has stated that Rule
32(d) of the North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure should be “liberally
construed in favor of the defendant and that leave to withdraw a guilty plea
before sentencing should be freely granted.”264 Abuses of discretion occur
when a court acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious manner or
misinterprets or misapplies the law.265 Additionally, Rule 11(c) of the
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a court advise a
defendant of certain rights before accepting a guilty plea.266
Here, the district court failed to clear up confusion as to whether a plea
agreement existed on Feist’s charge of possession of a pipe bomb.267 Because the court failed to inquire into the parties’ discussions as to whether a
plea agreement existed, it failed to comply with Rule 11(c).268 As a result,
the record was ambiguous as to whether a binding plea agreement existed,
so the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to
allow Feist to withdraw his guilty plea.269

258. Id. ¶ 17.
259. Id.
260. Id. ¶ 18 (citing Peltier v. State, 2003 ND 27, ¶ 12 n.1, 657 N.W.2d 238, 242).
261. Id. ¶ 19, 708 N.W.2d at 875-76.
262. Id. ¶ 20, 708 N.W.2d at 876 (citing N.D.R.CRIM.P. 32(d)(1) (2002)).
263. Id. ¶ 22 (citing State v. Sisson, 1997 ND 158, ¶15, 567 N.W.2d 839, 843).
264. Id. ¶ 21 (quoting State v. Millner, 409 N.W.2d 642, 644 (N.D. 1987)).
265. Id. (citing State v. Farrell, 2000 ND 26, ¶ 8, 606 N.W.2d 524, 528).
266. Id. ¶ 24, 708 N.W.2d at 876-77 (citing N.D.R.CRIM.P. 11(c) which provides that a court
is required to determine if a defendant’s guilty plea is fully understood by the defendant).
267. Id. ¶ 25, 708 N.W.2d at 877.
268. Id.
269. Id. ¶ 28.
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FAMILY LAW—CHILD CUSTODY—DISCRETION OF THE COURT
L.C.V. V. D.E.G.
In L.C.V. v. D.E.G.,270 L.C.V. (hereinafter “Lisa”) appealed from a
district court judgment, which found that D.E.G. (hereinafter “Doug”) was
the biological father of their child (“Ann”) and granted custody and child
support to Doug.271 Lisa argued that the court’s grant of custody was
arbitrary and clearly erroneous.272 In addition, Lisa asserted that she should
have been awarded attorney fees and retroactive child support for the period
during which she was the primary caregiver of Ann.273
On June 18, 2003, Lisa filed a paternity action against Doug for child
support because they were not married.274 After admitting to being Ann’s
father, Doug requested that the court grant him custody and child support
from Lisa.275 The court awarded Doug primary physical custody of Ann
and child support, but permitted liberal visitations for Lisa.276 Lisa requested retroactive child support for the time when she was Ann’s primary
caretaker, but the court declined her request.277 No attorneys’ fees were
granted for either party.278
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court assessed the grant of
custody under a limited scope of review, attempting only to determine if the
district court acted in the best interests and welfare of the child.279 The
supreme court evaluated the district court’s findings on a clearly erroneous
standard.280 If the district court’s rationale is supported by sufficient
specificity, then its award of custody has to be upheld.281
First, Lisa claimed that the district court had acted arbitrarily by
granting physical custody to Doug.282 Previously, the parties had agreed to
the appointment of a custody investigator, who submitted a final report
270. 2005 ND 180, 705 N.W.2d 257.
271. L.C.V., ¶ 1, 705 N.W.2d at 259.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. ¶ 2.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. ¶ 3, 705 N.W.2d at 259 (citing In re Griffey, 2002 ND 160, ¶ 5, 652 N.W.2d 351,
353). The North Dakota Century Code provides a list of factors the court must consider in
awarding custody. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (2004)).
280. Id.
281. Id. (citing Schmidt v. Schmidt, 2003 ND 55, ¶ 6, 660 N.W.2d 196, 199).
282. Id. ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 259-60.
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stating the parties should share custody on a schedule that would leave Lisa
as the primary physical custodian.283 The district court did not follow the
suggestion of the investigator, but did consider the report when making its
decision.284 The supreme court determined that the district court’s decision
to grant custody to Doug was not arbitrary because the investigator’s report
had been considered when making the decision.285
Next, Lisa claimed that two findings of fact made by the district court
were clearly erroneous.286 Lisa first contested the district court’s finding
that her testimony, regarding the amount of time that Doug spent with Ann,
was not credible based on the investigator’s report.287 Likewise, Lisa
contended the district court’s finding that Doug provided a more stable and
satisfactory environment for Ann was clearly erroneous.288 But the district
court made specific findings that Lisa had carried on various impermanent
romantic relationships, while Doug separated Ann from his outside
relationships.289 In addition, Doug separately testified that Ann was having
difficulty leaving him after their visits.290 Based on this information and
the investigator’s report, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that
the district court remained within its discretion and did not make clearly
erroneous findings of fact.291
The supreme court then reviewed the district court’s considerations for
awarding Doug physical custody of Ann.292 The district court made the
following findings:
[T]hat both parents have strong emotional ties to Ann but Doug is
best able to provide love and affection to Ann, because Lisa has
demonstrated stronger ties to her two older children from a prior
relationship and a lesser regard . . . for her relationship with
Ann . . . Doug has the capacity and disposition to best provide
guidance and education for Ann . . . [B]oth parents have the ability
to provide for Ann’s material needs, but Doug can provide a more
stable positive home environment for her . . . [B]oth parents are fit

283. Id.
284. Id. ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 260.
285. Id. (citing Hogan v. Hogan, 2003 ND 105, ¶ 10, 665 N.W.2d 672, 676 (explaining that
the court “cannot delegate to . . . an independent investigator its authority to award custody to the
parent who will promote the best interests and welfare of the child”)).
286. Id. ¶ 5.
287. Id.
288. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(d) (2004)).
289. Id.
290. Id. ¶ 6, 705 N.W.2d at 261.
291. Id.
292. Id. ¶ 8, 705 N.W.2d at 262 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (2004)).

2006]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

1061

to provide for Ann’s care, but Doug is overall the better choice to
have primary physical custody of Ann.293
Because the district court made the proper statutory considerations,
supported by the evidence, the supreme court would not substitute its own
judgment for the district court’s findings.294 The supreme court held the
“district court’s decision to award primary physical custody to Doug, with
liberal visitation privileges for Lisa, is supported by the record evidence and
is not clearly erroneous.”295
Next, Lisa claimed the district court’s failure to award her retroactive
child support as Ann’s primary caretaker was reversible error.296 Lisa
argued that the district court did not make any findings regarding her
request for retroactive child support.297 The supreme court determined that
the district court failed to make the necessary findings regarding child
support guidelines established by the Department of Human Services.298
The supreme court thus remanded the issue of retroactive child support for
additional findings of fact and redetermination.299
Finally, Lisa claimed that the district court’s failure to award her
attorney fees was reversible error.300 The supreme court disagreed with this
argument, finding that without either an agreement between the parties or a
statutory basis, attorney fees were improper.301 Thus, the supreme court
held that since there was no agreement in place, no statute to rely on, and no
argument that Doug made frivolous claims, Lisa’s claim for attorney fees
failed.302
The North Dakota Supreme Court granted Lisa’s appeal for reconsideration of retroactive child support and affirmed all other findings of the
district court.303

293. Id.
294. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 2005 ND 131, ¶ 12, 700 N.W.2d 711, 717).
295. Id.
296. Id. ¶ 10.
297. Id. ¶ 11.
298. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 705 N.W.2d at 262-63 (citing T.E.J. v. T.S., 2004 ND 120, ¶ 4, 681
N.W.2d 444, 446).
299. Id. ¶ 11, 705 N.W.2d at 263 (citing Lukenbill v. Fettig, 2001 ND 47, ¶ 9, 623 N.W.2d 7,
10 (stating that “where the court does not clearly set forth how its child support decision is in
compliance with the child support guidelines, or why it has decided to deviate therefrom, it is
appropriate to remand for additional findings and a redetermination of the issue”)).
300. Id. ¶ 12.
301. Id. ¶ 14 (citing Lukenbill, ¶ 14, 623 N.W.2d at 11).
302. Id. ¶ 14, 705 N.W.2d at 264 (citing Lukenbill, ¶ 15, 623 N.W.2d at 11).
303. Id. ¶ 15.
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FAMILY LAW–CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES–STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
SIMON V. SIMON
In Simon v. Simon,304 the Foster County Social Service Board, on
behalf of the State of North Dakota, appealed the district court’s interpretation of offset provisions “of the split custody and equal custody regulations of the child support guidelines.”305 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s interpretation, “concluding [that] the offset provisions apply to all split custody and equal custody cases, including those
where one parent assigns the right to receive child support to the State.”306
Because the parents shared equal and split custody of their children, at
issue was the district court’s interpretation of sections 75-02-04.1-03 and
75-02-04.1-08.2 of the North Dakota Administrative Code.307 Particularly,
the North Dakota Supreme Court had to determine whether to offset child
support where one parent had assigned the right to receive support to the
State.308 The State argued that the offset provisions of those sections were
not applicable when one parent had assigned the right to receive child
support to the State.309 Because the language of the sections was ambiguous, the State argued that deference should be given to the Child Support
Guidelines Drafting Committee’s (hereinafter “the Committee”) interpretation.310 Pursuant to section 75-02-04.1-03 of the North Dakota Administrative Code, once a district court has ordered split custody, each parent’s
child support obligation is determined, and the parent with the greater child
support obligation should pay the difference between the obligations to the
lesser obligated parent as offset.311 The court noted that section 75-0204.1-03 did not include an exception where the State had been assigned the
right to receive support.312
To determine the validity of the State’s arguments, the supreme court
reviewed the Committee’s recommendations prior to the 2003 amendment
of section 75-02-04.1-03 of the North Dakota Administrative Code.313 At
that time, the Committee had considered an exception to the offset provision where one parent’s right to receive child support was assigned to a
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

2006 ND 29, 709 N.W.2d 4.
Simon, ¶ 1, 709 N.W.2d at 6.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 13 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-03 (2005)).
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
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“governmental entity.”314 However, these recommendations were never
implemented because the Committee anticipated difficulties “when the
offset is not applied, including the fluctuating monthly amounts of child
support the parents would pay, how parents would receive notice of the
change in the monthly payment, and the consequences when one parent
could not pay his or her obligation.”315 But because the Committee had not
rejected language that permitted a party to assign the right to receive
support, the offset provision in section 75-02-04.1-03 encompassed
assignments.316
Therefore, the State’s argument, based on the North Dakota Supreme
Court’s interpretation of section 75-02-04.1-03 of the North Dakota
Administrative Code failed. Despite an assignment of rights to the State,
there is no provision in the statute or its legislative history for deference to
be paid to the Committee’s reasonable interpretation of the statute, which
would require the offset provision to be set aside.317 The court affirmed the
district court’s interpretation of section 75-02-04.1-03.318
To determine the child support obligation of each parent where the
parents hold equal custody, the court evaluated section 75-02-04.1-08.2 of
the North Dakota Administrative Code.319 The statute provides:
A child support obligation must be determined as described in this
section in all cases in which a court orders each parent to have
equal physical custody of their child or children. Equal physical
custody means each parent has physical custody of the child, or if
there are multiple children, all of the children, exactly fifty percent
of the time. A child support obligation for each parent must be
calculated under this chapter assuming the other parent is the
custodial parent of the child or children subject to the equal
physical custody order. The lesser obligation is then subtracted
from the greater. The difference is the child support amount owed
by the parent with the greater obligation. Each parent is an obligee
314. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Minutes of the Department of Human Services Child Support Guidelines
Drafting Advisory Committee 15 (May 29, 2002)).
315. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Minutes of the Department of Human Services Child Support Guidelines
Drafting Advisory Committee 3-4 (June 6, 2002)).
316. Id. ¶ 17 (citing Little v. Tracy, 497 N.W.2d 700, 705 (N.D. 1993)).
317. Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 709 N.W.2d at 10 (citing State ex rel. Clayburgh v. American West Cmty.
Promotions, Inc., 2002 ND 98, ¶¶ 7-9, 645 N.W.2d 196, 200-02) (stating that “[a]n administrative
agency’s interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference if the statute is complex and technical
in nature, or if the statute is reenacted after a contemporaneous and continuous construction of the
statute by the administrative agency”). The court explained that because neither of these
conditions existed in Simon v. Simon, less weight need be given to the agency. Id.
318. Id. ¶ 20.
319. Id. ¶ 21.
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to the extent of the other parent’s calculated obligation. Each
parent is an obligor to the extent of that parent’s calculated
obligation.320
When interpreting section 75-02-04.1-08.2 of the Administrative Code,
the North Dakota Supreme Court relied on the Committee’s guidance. 321
The court rejected the State’s argument that an offset exception should be
triggered when the State is assigned the right to receive child support
payments, specifically noting that section 75-02-04.1-08.2 had been drafted
with section 75-02-04.1-03 in mind.322 Because the offset provision in
section 75-02-04.1-08.2 was based on the same provision in 75-02-04.1-03,
with the goal of having consistent application, the court held that no
exception existed for the State to set aside offset where it was assigned the
rights to receive child support payments.323
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s
interpretation of the North Dakota Administrative Code.324
FAMILY LAW—EQUITABLE-OFFSET REMEDY
HEWSON V . HEWSON
In Hewson v. Hewson,325 Leon Hewson appealed from the trial court’s
amended judgment, which ordered that he pay Joselyn Privratsky (formerly
“Joselyn Hewson”) $17,852 to correct an unequal asset distribution
resulting from the parties’ divorce.326 The North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, based upon the trial court’s failure to make specific
findings as to the determination of the $17,852 figure and if the amount of
credit for child support that Privratsky may have owed Hewson was
included in that figure.327
The Hewsons divorced in July of 1991.328 Under the terms of their
divorce decree, Hewson received custody of their children.329 Both parties
entered into a property settlement agreement that was incorporated into the

320. Id. ¶ 21 (quoting N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-08.2 (2005)).
321. Id. ¶ 22.
322. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Minutes of the Department of Human Services Child Support Guidelines
Drafting Advisory Committee 6 (June 11, 2002)).
323. Id. ¶ 22.
324. Id. ¶ 23, 709 N.W.2d at 11.
325. 2006 ND 16, 708 N.W.2d 889.
326. Hewson, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d at 891.
327. Id.
328. Id. ¶ 2.
329. Id.

2006]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

1065

divorce judgment.330 The property settlement stated that Hewson would
retain the majority of the marital assets as an offset to receiving child
support from Privratsky because Privratsky could not afford to pay more
than $10 per child in monthly child support.331 Therefore, by accepting the
settlement agreement, Hewson was not able to receive child support from
Privratsky.332 The divorce judgment stated that the agreement was a contract that could not be modified by either the parties or the court, and
Hewson agreed to indemnify Privratsky and hold her harmless for any
future child support claims.333
In 1995, Hewson commenced an action through Southwest Area Child
Support Enforcement Unit (hereinafter “SACSEU”), whereby Privratsky
agreed to pay a monthly amount of $126 per child in child support, which
was incorporated into an amended judgment.334 In 2003, Hewson requested
another review of Privratsky’s child support obligation.335 The SACSEU
moved to increase her obligation, to which Privratsky argued that she had
given up all marital property in lieu of child support.336 Upon holding a
hearing on February 3, 2004, the trial court ordered that the amount of
forfeited property be calculated and deducted from the amount of child
support owed since 1991, the year that the parties divorced.337
In May 2004, the trial court ordered that custody of the children be
transferred to Privratsky.338 In addition, the court ordered Hewson to pay
$1,146 in monthly child support and terminated Privratsky’s support
obligation.339
In January 2005, the trial court found that Privratsky had paid a total of
$12,852 in child support to Hewson since their divorce.340 The court stated:
I have a strong feeling that after land valuation, credits and debits,
due consideration for what everyone should and could have paid
and done, that the bottom of the tape would show that Leon owes
Joselyn around $18,000.
....

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 708 N.W.2d at 892.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
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So from the disproportionate property division, Leon still owes
Joselyn $17,852 which, by great co-incidence [sic], comes very
close to the amount that Joselyn paid directly in child support plus
about $5,000 in attorney’s fees.341
On April 26, 2005, the trial court ordered Hewson to pay Privratsky
$17,852 to correct the unequal asset distribution that resulted from the
divorce.342
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Hewson raised two
issues, whether: (1) the trial court erred when it applied the equitable-offset
remedy to offset the amount of marital property that Privratsky gave up
against her child support obligation; and (2) the trial court erred in its
finding that the amount of the equitable offset was $17,852.343 Hewson
argued that the trial court erred by failing to state how it arrived at the
$17,852 figure.344 But Privratsky disagreed and stated that there was
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order.345
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the trial court could
only modify the parties’ child support obligation, and not their property
settlement, in an amended judgment.346 The supreme court has maintained
a longstanding principle that “a trial court ‘does not have continuing jurisdiction to modify a property distribution in a divorce judgment, but has
continuing jurisdiction to modify child support.’”347
Next, the court evaluated whether the trial court erred when it applied
the equitable-offset remedy to Privratsky’s marital property for her child
support obligation.348 Using a de novo standard of review, the court
reviewed the divorce decree, specifically the child support obligations.349
Notably, the court stated that a child support agreement should be accepted
by a trial court only if the agreement represented the best interests of the
child.350
In Rueckert v. Rueckert,351 the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a clause in a divorce decree that limited the court’s power to

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9 (citing Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863, 868 (N.D. 1993)).
499 N.W.2d 863 (N.D. 1993).
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modify child support agreements was void as against public policy.352
Additionally, the court found that when a parent foregoes property rights in
marital assets in order to waive paying future child support, that parent
could offset the value of the assets from the amount of the child support
obligation.353 The court noted that this remedy was not intended to supercede a child’s right to receive support from both parents, but rather was
intended to grant parents credit for property settlements.354 Furthermore,
the court noted that the result of offsetting child support with marital
property was that it placed responsibility for the support of their children on
both parents.355 In addition, the court stated in Rueckert that the forfeiture
of property would only be a prepayment of child support when equity
demanded it and the child’s right to support was not superseded.356
Here, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the trial court’s use
of the equitable-offset remedy was appropriate.357 The court found that the
equitable-offset remedy would not adversely affect the support to the
parties’ children because Hewson’s custody rights had been terminated and
transferred to Privratsky and one of the children was no longer a minor.358
Next, the North Dakota Supreme Court evaluated whether the trial
court erred when finding that the amount of equitable-offset was
$17,852.359 Relying on Dufner v. Dufner,360 “[a]s a matter of law, a trial
court must clearly set forth how it arrived at the amount of income and level
of support.”361 Here, the trial court determined the $17,852 offset figure on
merely a “strong feeling,” rather than making a specific finding on the
record.362 Therefore, the determination by the trial court fell below the
standard set forth in Dufner.363 Since the trial court made no clear determination as to its calculation of the $17,852 offset figure, the supreme court
could not determine whether Privratsky owed child support to Hewson or
whether she was entitled to future credit for paying too much in child
support.364

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d at 868.
Id. at 870-71.
Hewson, ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d at 893.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
Id. ¶ 14, 708 N.W.2d at 894.
2002 N.D. 47, 640 N.W.2d 694.
Hewson, ¶ 14, 708 N.W.2d at 894 (quoting Dufner, ¶ 22, 640 N.W.2d at 701).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court ordered the trial court to use the
framework set forth in Rueckert to make specific findings of fact as to the
values and offset amounts that Privratsky should be credited from the time
of entry in the original divorce decree to the first order establishing child
support in July of 1995.365 In order to do this, the trial court must evaluate
Privratsky’s gross income and the guidelines during that time frame.366
Then, the trial court was ordered to calculate the amount of child support
Privratsky owed from July 20, 1995, the date of the amended judgment, to
July 2, 2003, the day before the SACSEU made a motion to increase
support.367 Because a court cannot retroactively modify unpaid child support, the trial court must reinstate the $126 in monthly child support per
child that was ordered on July 20, 1995.368 Then, the trial court must
calculate the amount of child support owed under guidelines effective July
2, 2003, through April 20, 2004 (the day before custody of the children
changed hands from one parent to the other).369 Once the total amount of
child support due is determined, the court must subtract the amount
Privratsky has paid from the total owed.370 Finally, the total amount unpaid
must be offset by the value of the property Privratsky relinquished in the
divorce decree.371 Upon this calculation, if there was credit in favor of
Privratsky, then this credited amount would be owed to Hewson if custody
changed hands to Hewson.372
In conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded
for further proceedings. 373
FAMILY LAW—TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS—STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
IN RE IN THE INTEREST OF M.B. AND N.B. V. I.B.
I.B., father of M.B. and N.B., appealed the juvenile court’s orders,
which ended his rights as a parent and denied his motion for continued
365. Id. ¶15.
366. Id.
367. Id. (citing Geinert v. Geinert, 2002 ND 135, ¶ 10, 649 N.W.2d 237, 241 (“[A]
modification of child support generally should be made effective from the date of the motion to
modify, absent good reason to set some other date. The trial court retains discretion to set some
later effective date, but its reasons for doing so should be apparent or explained.”)).
368. Id.; see Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863, 870 n.4 (N.D. 1993) (stating that a court
may not retroactively modify unpaid child support).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. ¶ 16.
373. Id. ¶ 17.
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visitation.374 The trial court determined that I.B. was aware of the proceedings he faced and the evidence supported terminating I.B.’s parental
rights.375 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
findings.376
I.B. and K.S. had two children prior to marrying in 2000, and four
years later they divorced.377 Each child had been diagnosed with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder.378 Because
the parents had exposed the children to domestic violence in the home,
sexual activity, and pornographic and horror films, the juvenile court found
the children were deprived and placed them in the custody of social services
in April 2002.379 The children remained in the custody of social services
only intermittently, though, because the juvenile court allowed the children
to reunify with their parents in the summer of 2002.380 In July 2004, social
worker Marlene Sorum petitioned the court to terminate the parental rights
of I.B. and K.S.381 The children’s mother, K.S., consented to having her
parental rights terminated; however, the children’s father, I.B., “appeared to
defend against the petition,” arguing that he wished to provide for M.B. and
N.B.382 Although the children’s guardian ad litem proposed a reunification
with the father, a judicial referee found the kids deprived after a three-day
trial and ordered the termination of I.B.’s parental rights.383 Sorum
prepared the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, which were all
adopted in full.384
Following I.B.’s request for judicial review of his terminated parental
and visitation rights, the district judge affirmed.385 The North Dakota
Century Code requires that a petition to terminate parental rights set out
plainly:
[t]he facts which bring the child within the jurisdiction of the
court, with a statement that it is in the best interest of the child and
the public that the proceeding be brought and, if delinquency or

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

In re Interest of M.B. and N.B. v. I.B., 2006 ND 19, ¶ 1, 709 N.W.2d 11, 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
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unruly conduct is alleged, that the child is in need of treatment or
rehabilitation.386
In addition, the petition must make the parent aware of the specific
circumstances supporting the proposed termination.387 Furthermore, the
petition must include specific facts that will be used to terminate the
parental rights so that any opposing parent has notice of the claims and is
given an opportunity to “meaningfully prepare a defense against the
petition.”388
Sorum’s petition included sufficient factual basis for the requested
termination of parental rights.389 The factual basis included numerous domestic violence disputes, a history of abusive behavior, I.B.’s own concerns
regarding his ability to financially support the children, and the failure of
either parent to continue treatment for the children’s disorders, as well as
their own.390 Based on the factual findings made by the trial court, the
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that I.B.’s due process rights were
not violated because he was made aware of the evidence that Sorum relied
on, and I.B. did not appear to be prejudiced at trial or unable to defend
against the charges.391
Next, I.B. argued that the referee improperly delegated judicial authority to Sorum by assigning her the preparation of proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law and then adopting those findings in whole.392 In
North Dakota, a trial court may delegate the duty of preparing findings of
fact and conclusions of law to one or both parties.393 Rule 52(a) of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The findings of a master or juvenile referee, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court.
It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision
filed by the court.394
While a court’s adoption of one party’s proposed findings of fact is
discouraged, once the court signs those findings, they become the court’s
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. ¶ 6, 709 N.W.2d at 15 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-21(1) (2005)).
Id. ¶ 7 (citing Thompson v. King, 393 N.W.2d 733, 738 (N.D. 1986)).
Id. (citing In re Interest of T.M.M., 267 N.W.2d 807, 813 (N.D. 1978)).
Id. ¶ 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9, 709 N.W.2d at 16.
Id. ¶10 (citing N.D.R.CT. 7.1(b)(1)).
Id. (quoting N.D.R.CIV.P. 52(a)).
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findings and will not be thrown out unless clearly erroneous.395 Even where
the trial court announces its decision via letter and asks the triumphant party
to prepare the findings, the decision will not be reversed.396
Here, the judicial referee’s decision was communicated by letter and
requested that Sorum prepare the findings of fact.397 The findings were
adopted in whole by the referee and signed.398 The supreme court held that
the findings were not clearly erroneous, and therefore, affirmed the trial
court’s ruling.399
In North Dakota, the standard of review for rendering whether a
parent’s rights should have been terminated is “clearly erroneous.”400 The
North Dakota Century Code requires, where parental rights are at stake, that
the petitioner prove by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) ‘the child is a
deprived child,’ (2) ‘that conditions and causes of deprivation are likely to
continue or will not be remedied,’ and (3) ‘that by reason thereof the child
is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or
emotional harm.’”401 In North Dakota, a court’s termination of parental
rights will be upheld unless the decision is clearly erroneous, meaning that
“no evidence exists to support the finding, or if, on the entire record, [the
court is] left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake ha[d] been
made.”402 North Dakota Century Code defines a deprived child as:
[one] without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for
the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals, and
the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack of financial means
of the child’s parents, guardian, or other custodian.403
The North Dakota Supreme Court has defined proper parental care as the
“minimum standards of care which the community will tolerate.”404
Based on the record, the supreme court found that sufficient evidence
existed to hold that the children were deprived.405 The evidence included

395. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Foster v. Foster, 2004 ND 226, ¶ 10, 690 N.W.2d 197; N.D.R.CIV.P.
52(a)).
396. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Foster, ¶¶ 7, 10, 690 N.W.2d 197).
397. Id. ¶ 12.
398. Id.
399. Id. ¶ 15, 709 N.W.2d at 17-18.
400. Id. ¶ 13 (citing N.D.R.CIV.P. 52(a)).
401. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b) (2005); In re Interest of M.M.S., 449
N.W.2d 574, 577 (N.D. 1989)).
402. Id. (citing Adoption of S.R F., 2004 ND 150, ¶ 8, 683 N.W.2d 913, 916)).
403. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(8)(a) (2005)).
404. Id. (citing Interest of D.Q., 2002 ND 188, ¶ 12, 653 N.W.2d 713, 719).
405. Id. ¶ 15.
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the lower court’s findings that: (1) the children were deprived; (2) the
family’s home was “unkempt”; (3) the parents exhibited violent behavior
toward one another; and (4) the children suffered abuse and the threat of
abuse at the hands of I.B.406 In addition, the lower court noted other
instances in which I.B. did not meet the minimum standard of care in
parenting his children.407
But in North Dakota, parental rights will not be terminated unless
prognostic evidence is provided showing that deprivation is “likely to continue or will not be remedied.”408 Prognostic evidence includes the lack of
cooperation displayed by the parents, the parents’ background, and the
reports and opinions of professionals involved.409
Based on the conclusions of a social worker, a parent aide, two therapists, and M.B. and N.B.’s mother, the supreme court held that sufficient
evidence existed to find that continued deprivation would occur if the
children were returned to I.B.410 Despite I.B.’s alleged desire to be reunited
with the boys, his prior avoidance of interaction with the boys, the boys’
fear of I.B., and I.B.’s lack of understanding regarding the effort required to
provide for the children were held to be substantial grounds to find that
continued deprivation would occur.411
Finally, the North Dakota Century Code requires the petitioner to prove
that the “child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental,
moral, or emotional harm” if not removed from the care of the parent.412
Based on prognostic testimony, the supreme court found that I.B.’s parental
rights should be terminated.413 The evidence included the boys’ past
exposure to mental and physical abuse, sexual abuse, and violent and
pornographic films.414
In I.B.’s final argument regarding the termination of his parental rights,
he claimed that reasonable efforts had not been made by Cass County

406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. ¶ 16, 709 N.W.2d at 18 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) (2005)).
409. Id. (citing Interest of T.K., 2001 ND 127, ¶ 14, 630 N.W.2d 38, 44; Interest of A.S.,
1998 ND 181, ¶ 19, 584 N.W.2d 853, 856-57; Interest of D.Q., 2002 ND 188, ¶ 21, 653 N.W.2d
713, 721),
410. Id. ¶ 17, 709 N.W.2d at 18-19.
411. Id. The court further noted that since the boys had entered foster care their behavior had
improved and that a proper caregiver-child relationship had been established with the foster
parents. Id.
412. Id. ¶ 18, 709 N.W.2d at 19 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) (2005)).
413. Id. ¶ 19.
414. Id.
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Social Services to return the boys to his care.415 The North Dakota Century
Code has stated that “reasonable efforts” means:
[t]he exercise of due diligence, by the agency granted authority
over the child . . . to use appropriate and available services to meet
the needs of the child and the child’s family in order to prevent
removal of the child from the child’s family or, after removal, to
use appropriate and available services to eliminate the need for
removal and to reunite the child and the child’s family. In determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child under
this section, and in making reasonable efforts, the child’s health
and safety must be the paramount concern.416
The supreme court concluded, based on sufficient testimony received
by the referee, that “reasonable efforts” were attempted.417 I.B. did not take
part in the boys’ counseling. Among other evidence, I.B. did not improve
the boys’ living space and was continually at odds with his desire to have
parental control over M.B. and N.B.418
Finally, I.B. contested the denial of visitation rights.419 Based on the
court’s previous holding that sufficient evidence was produced to terminate
I.B.’s parental rights, the court deemed the issue of his right to visitation as
moot.420
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile
court.421

415. Id. ¶ 20.
416. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-32.2(1) (2005)) (emphasis added). The North
Dakota Century Code further provides that reasonable efforts must be made to preserve and
reunify families prior to the placement of the child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need
for removing the child from the child’s home and to make it possible for a child to return safely to
the child’s home. If the court or the child’s custodian determined that continuation of reasonable
efforts is inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child, reasonable efforts must be made to
place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan and to complete
whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-32.2.
417. In re M B., ¶ 21, 709 N.W.2d at 19.
418. Id. I.B. took little interest in parenting, as was evident from his behavior in not
maintaining his home, in rarely being home, and in sleeping all day when he was at home. Id.
419. Id. ¶ 22, 709 N.W.2d at 20.
420. Id. (citing In re Interest of L.B.B., 2005 ND 220, ¶ 9, 707 N.W.2d 469, 472; Wanner v.
N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 201, ¶ 31, 654 N.W.2d 760, 773)
421. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
DAVIS V. KILLU
In Davis v. Killu,422 Anthony Davis appealed from a judgment entered
on a jury verdict dismissing a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Keith
Killu, Dr. Philip Hershberger, and other healthcare providers.423 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.424
In May 2000, Davis was experiencing pain in his right ankle, so his
urologist referred him to Dr. Killu, an internal medicine physician, who
diagnosed Davis with cellulites and possible osteomyelitis.425 Upon diagnosis, Davis was admitted to the hospital for an antibiotic IV.426 Despite
the intravenous drip, Davis’s condition did not improve, and Dr. Killu consulted an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Hershberger.427 Dr. Hershberger determined that treatment of Davis’s left ankle required incision and drainage,
debridement, and exploration of the bone.428 In addition, Dr. Hershberger
initiated a six-week course of intravenous antibiotics when Davis was
released from the hospital on June 30, 2000.429
On July 11, 2000, Davis returned to Dr. Killu who was convinced that
his condition had improved and continued administering antibiotics for
another six weeks.430 Dr. Killu recommended that Davis should follow up
with the orthopedic clinic.431 On July 28, 2000, Davis saw Dr. Ravindra
Joshi, another orthopedic surgeon, who determined that a blister on Davis’s
foot tested positive for blastomycosis, a fungal infection of the bone that
does not respond to antibiotics.432 Because the fungal infection could not
be treated, Davis’s leg was amputated in August 2000.433
In February 2002, Davis commenced a malpractice action against Dr.
Killu and Dr. Hershberger, alleging that they were negligent in failing to
timely diagnose and treat the infection in his ankle.434 Davis specifically
claimed that he lost his leg because of the doctors’ alleged negligence.435 In
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

2006 ND 32, 710 N.W.2d 118.
Davis, ¶ 1, 710 N.W.2d at 119.
Id. at 120.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
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August 2004, a jury found that neither of the doctors were negligent in the
care and treatment of Davis.436
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Davis argued that the
trial court’s evidentiary rulings constituted reversible error.437 Specifically,
Davis argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow his medical
expert to testify, admitting evidence that he had been fired from his employment, and excluding evidence of Dr. Hershberger’s licensing status.438 The
North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that trial courts are given broad
discretion to rule on evidentiary matters, and a trial court’s rulings will not
be overturned unless an abuse of discretion has occurred.439 Rule 61 of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides that no judgment shall be
overturned unless refusal to admit or exclude evidence “appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice.”440
First, Davis argued that the trial court erred when it refused to allow the
testimony of a medical expert, Dr. Henry Masur, regarding opinions contained in Davis’s original Mayo Clinic medical records.441 The trial court
redacted physicians’ opinions from the records for the purpose of trial, and
Davis argued that Dr. Masur should have been allowed to testify with
respect to those opinions.442 In redacting the physicians’ opinions from
Davis’s medical records, the trial court relied on the ruling in Patterson v.
Hutchens,443 which did not admit the opinion of a physician, who was
neither a witness at trial nor was available for cross-examination.444 Here,
no Mayo Clinic physicians testified at trial.445 Therefore, based on the
reasoning in Patterson, the parties agreed to redact the physicians’ opinions
in Davis’s Mayo Clinic medical records before admitting those records into
evidence, and accordingly the trial court ordered the redaction of the
physicians’ opinions.446 Then, Dr. Hershberger brought a motion in limine
to exclude Dr. Masur from testifying as to his medical opinions that had

436. Id.
437. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 14, 17, 710 N.W.2d at 120-24.
438. Id.
439. Id. ¶ 6 (citing Forster v. W. Dakota Veterinary Clinic, 2004 ND 207, ¶ 40, 689 N.W.2d
366).
440. Id. (citing N.D.R.CIV.P. 61) (stating “[n]o error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence. . . is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating,
modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice”).
441. Id. ¶ 7.
442. Id.
443. 529 N.W.2d 561 (N.D. 1995).
444. Davis, ¶ 8, 710 N.W.2d at 121 (citing Patterson, 529 N.W.2d at 564-65).
445. Id.
446. Id.
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been redacted from the records.447 Although Davis made no offer of proof
to the specific testimony, he contended that the trial court’s ruling was
“plain error,” in violation of Rule 703 of the North Dakota Federal Rules of
Evidence, which provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.448
Davis asserted that Dr. Masur should have been allowed to testify as to the
redacted opinions in the medical records because the opinions constituted
facts or data reasonably relied upon by Dr. Masur to form his expert
opinion.449
Historically, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that expert
witnesses “should be permitted to describe otherwise inadmissible hearsay
relied upon in order to give the basis for the opinion”450 Yet, the court has
recognized that it would be an injustice if expert witnesses were allowed
“free reign” as a mouthpiece for inadmissible hearsay.451 In order to
balance this contradiction, courts have weighed the probative value of the
hearsay with the danger of unfair prejudice, pursuant to Rule 703 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.452 In Davis’s case, the unaltered portions of the
record were not present on appeal, and the record showed that Davis made
no offer of proof.453 The court found that because these critical elements
were absent, it was unable to determine whether the evidence that would
have been presented was an attempt to allow the jury to hear inadmissible
hearsay or would assist Dr. Masur in relaying his expert opinion.454
Therefore, the court could not state whether or not the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding the evidence.455
Next, Davis argued that the trial court erred in admitting testimony as
to his termination of employment from Tioga High School.456 Davis
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
382).
456.

Id.
Id. ¶ 9 (citing N.D.R.EV. 703).
Id.
Id. ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Messner, 1998 ND 151, ¶ 26, 583 N.W.2d 109, 114).
Id. at 122.
Id. ¶ 11 (citing United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Id. ¶ 13, 710 N.W.2d at 123.
Id.
Id. (citing Forster v. W. Dakota Veterinary Clinic, 2004 ND 207, ¶ 43, 689 N.W.2d 366,
Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
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claimed that testimony as to his termination of employment was irrelevant
and inadmissible.457 On direct examination, Davis discussed his employment background, and on cross-examination he was asked if he was terminated from his teaching position at Tioga High School.458 Davis’s counsel
objected, and the trial court ruled that the reasons for his termination must
be excluded as prejudicial, but the termination testimony itself was
admissible to complete the picture of his employment background.459
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed that the questioning
regarding the termination of Davis’s employment was irrelevant.460 But the
court would not overturn the trial court’s admittance of the testimony
because such testimony did not affect Davis’s substantial rights.461 As
evidence that Davis’s substantial rights were not affected, the court stated
that the testimony had no bearing on the weight of the jury’s finding that
Dr. Killu and Dr. Hershberger were not negligent in treating Davis.462
Therefore, admission of testimony regarding Davis’s termination from
employment was harmless error.463
Next, Davis argued that the trial court erred in prohibiting evidence
regarding Dr. Hershberger’s licensing status.464 While being deposed, Dr.
Hershberger suggested that he was not licensed to practice at UniMed
Medical Center in Minot, but rather was only licensed to practice at the
affiliated clinic, Medical Arts Clinic.465 Before trial, Dr. Hershberger raised
a motion in limine to exclude the testimony as to his licensing status.466 At
the in limine hearing, Hershberger’s counsel stated that Hershberger was
licensed to practice in North Dakota, and that UniMed Medical Center is
affiliated with Medical Arts Clinic in which Hershberger was licensed to
practice.467 On the fourth day of trial, a question arose regarding the
resolution of this evidence.468 When the issue was raised, the record
showed that Davis’s counsel failed to object, which prevented Davis from
preserving an objection on the record for appeal.469 Therefore, Davis’s

457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.

Id. ¶ 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. (citing In re K.S., 2002 ND 164, ¶ 11, 652 N.W.2d 341, 346).
Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 124.
Id. ¶ 17, 710 N.W.2d at 124.
Id. at ¶ 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20 (citing May v. Sprynczynatyk, 2005 ND 76, ¶ 25, 695 N.W.2d 196, 203).
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failure to object at trial resulted in a waiver of later claiming error on the
issue.470 In addition, the court stated that the evidence as to licensing may
have been relevant in a negligence suit against the clinic and medical
center, but it had no bearing on the negligence of Dr. Hershberger.471
In conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed all three
evidentiary issues.472
MENTAL HEALTH—INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
IN RE INTEREST OF M.M.
M.M. appealed two orders issued by the District Court of Stutsman
County.473 The first order mandated the hospitalization of M.M. at the
North Dakota State Hospital for a period not to exceed forty-five days, and
the second order mandated involuntary treatment with medication.474 M.M.
argued that he was not mentally ill, he did not require medical treatment,
and involuntary hospitalization and treatment were not the least restrictive
alternatives to his medical care.475
M.M. was a fifty-five year old male, who was admitted to Trinity
Hospital in Minot, North Dakota, because of a complaint that he was unable
to urinate.476 M.M. refused surgery when learning that kidney stones were
the cause of his urinary retention.477 While being treated, hospital staff
noticed M.M. displayed grandiose delusions.478 Upon witnessing these
behaviors, a psychiatric consultant filed a Petition for Involuntary Commitment based on statements that were termed to be psychotic and
delusional.479 M.M. was then sent to the state hospital, where he was
treated without surgery.480
Upon entering the state hospital, M.M. told Dr. Pryatel that he was a
grey ghost involved with military intelligence and a stunt man.481 At trial,
Dr. Pryatel stated his belief that M.M. was a homeless hitchhiker, who
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. ¶ 21.
473. In re M.M., 2005 ND 219, ¶ 1, 707 N.W.2d 78, 79.
474. Id.
475. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 707 N.W.2d at 80.
476. Id. ¶ 2, 707 N.W.2d at 79.
477. Id.
478. Id. ¶ 3. M.M.’s delusions included statements where he claimed to be able to speak
many languages, be related to famous people including the President of the United States, and
exist as a color. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
481. Id. ¶ 5.
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panhandled for money.482 During his hospitalization, M.M. was capable of
feeding himself and sustained sufficient personal hygiene.483 Dr. Pryatel
also testified that M.M.’s kidney condition presented serious risks if untreated.484 Dr. Pryatel testified that surgery, in combination with medicine,
was M.M.’s only treatment option.485 Furthermore, Dr. Pryatel had serious
doubts regarding M.M.’s ability to function in society or manage his
medical condition.486
M.M. argued that he was not in need of medication or surgery to
maintain his physical or mental health.487 M.M. asserted that his physical
condition was not life threatening and claimed that he was not mentally ill
because he had not been diagnosed with any mental illness in the past, nor
had he experienced episodes of inflicting injury upon himself or others.488
M.M. testified that the statements made at Trinity Hospital were a result of
him being in intense pain.489 Unlike the previous statements that he made
at Trinity Hospital, at trial M.M. stated that he was not related to any
presidents, but he did state that he had performed stunts and that he was
fluent in both Russian and Chinese.490 Based on this evidence, the trial
court found that M.M. was in need of involuntary hospitalization.491
In North Dakota, a trial court has the power to order an involuntary
commitment of an individual under certain circumstances.492 Involuntary
commitment is appropriate when the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the individual was mentally ill, and if not treated
would pose a serious risk to himself, others, or property.493 The supreme
court reviewed the trial court’s findings under a “clearly erroneous” standard of review.494 The supreme court determined that M.M.’s behavior at
Trinity Hospital, combined with Dr. Pryatel’s opinion that M.M. was
mentally ill, was enough to support the trial court’s finding of his mental
illness.495

482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7, 707 N.W.2d at 80.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 9 (citing In re Interest of D.Z., 2002 ND 132, ¶6, 649 N.W.2d 231, 234).
Id.
Id. ¶ 10, 707 N.W.2d at 80-81.
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M.M. argued that he did not require treatment because he was not a
physical threat to himself, others, or property.496 But “[w]hen one or more
reasonable inferences can be drawn from credible evidence, this Court must
accept the inferences drawn by the trial court.”497 Here, expert testimony
was provided to demonstrate that without medical attention M.M.’s condition would result in renal failure, which would cause M.M. to be a danger to
himself.498
M.M. also argued that the trial court erred in ordering involuntary
commitment rather than ordering some less restrictive treatment.499 M.M.
relied on North Dakota law, which provided that “[w]hen an individual is
found to be a person requiring treatment he has the right to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of the treatment.”500 A
two-part inquiry is required to determine the least restrictive environment:
“(1) whether a treatment program other than hospitalization is adequate to
meet the individual’s treatment needs; and (2) whether an alternative
treatment program is sufficient to prevent harm or injuries which the
individual may inflict upon himself or others.”501 Furthermore, the North
Dakota Supreme Court requires a trial court to show by clear and convincing evidence that alternative treatment was not adequate, or that
hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative.502
During trial, the court heard testimony from Dr. Pryatel that hospitalization and medication were the only effective treatment for M.M.’s
psychiatric condition.503 Because M.M. was a homeless transient, no
outpatient or rehabilitation arrangements could be made, leaving involuntary commitment as the only option.504 Taking into consideration the
testimony of Dr. Pryatel and M.M.’s needs, the trial court found that
involuntary hospitalization did not violate his rights, and therefore, was the
least restrictive medical treatment.505
M.M’s final argument on appeal was that the trial court erred in
permitting involuntary treatment using medication.506 Dr. Pryatel requested
authorization to treat M.M. with a variety of different medications, as
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.

Id. ¶ 11.
Id. (quoting In re Interest of D.Z., ¶ 9, 649 N.W.2d at 235).
Id.
Id. ¶12.
Id. (quoting In re Interest of D.Z., ¶ 10, 649 N.W.2d at 235).
Id. (quoting In re Interest of D.Z., ¶ 10, 649 N.W.2d at 235).
Id.
Id. ¶ 13, 707 N.W.2d at 81.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. ¶ 14.
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necessary, to treat M.M.’s condition.507 Dr. Pryatel was of the opinion that
M.M.’s mental health would improve substantially from the administration
of the medication.508 But in order for a trial court to authorize the
involuntary administration of medication, the treating psychiatrist and
another licensed physician must certify the medication order, and the court
must find by clear and convincing evidence, the following factors under
section 25-03.1-18.1 of the North Dakota Century Code:
“1.a. Upon notice and hearing, a treating psychiatrist may request
authorization from the court to treat a person under a mental health
treatment order with prescribed medication. The request may be
considered by the court in an involuntary treatment hearing. As a
part of the request, the treating psychiatrist and another licensed
physician or psychiatrist not involved in the current diagnosis or
treatment of the patient shall certify:
(1) That the proposed prescribed medication is clinically
appropriate and necessary to effectively treat the patient and
that the patient is a person requiring treatment;
(2) That the patient was offered that treatment and refused it
or that the patient lacks the capacity to make or communicate
a responsible decision about the treatment;
(3) That prescribed medication is the least restrictive form of
intervention necessary to meet the treatment needs of the
patient; and
(4) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the known
risks to the patient.”509
The trial court found that all of the factors listed in section 25-03.118.1 were proven by clear and convincing evidence. Using Dr. Pryatel’s
testimony, the supreme court found that the trial court’s finding was not
clearly erroneous.510 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s finding that M.M. was a mentally ill individual requiring involuntary hospitalization and treatment.511
Justice Kapsner wrote a dissenting opinion.512 In her dissent, Justice
Kapsner argued that M.M.’s refusal to submit to surgery was not sufficient
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-18.1 (2005)).
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶¶ 22-24, 707 N.W.2d at 83-84 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
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evidence to diagnosis him as being mentally ill.513 Additionally, Justice
Kapsner questioned the trial court’s finding that M.M. was mentally ill,
citing the fact that M.M. was competent to testify and was maintaining
daily living activities even though he was not medicated.514
PERSONAL INJURY LAW—NEGLIGENCE—SUMMARY J UDGMENT
PEREZ V. NICHOLS
In Perez v. Nichols,515 the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendant Ronnie Nichols, stating that no reasonable jury could
find Nichols negligent of injuries sustained by the passenger in his vehicle
at the time of the accident.516 On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
Court, Sheila Perez, the passenger and plaintiff, argued that questions of
fact still existed regarding “whether Nichols kept a proper lookout while
entering an intersection and whether Nichols was negligent for not having
his van equipped with seat belts.”517 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.518
In Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic,519 the North Dakota Supreme Court
defined summary judgment as:
a procedural device under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56 for prompt and
expeditious disposition of a controversy without a trial if either
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and if no dispute
exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn
from undisputed facts, or if resolving disputed facts would not
alter the result.520
Additionally, “the party moving for summary judgement must show
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the case is appropriate for judgment as a matter of law.”521 The court also noted that all
favorable inferences will be drawn in favor of the opposing party, and the

513. Id. ¶ 20-21, 707 N.W.2d at 83 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (citing Cruzan v. Director Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)) (explaining that competent individuals have a
constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, while an incompetent person is not able
to make an informed and voluntary decision in exercising this constitutional right to refuse
treatment).
514. Id. ¶¶ 22-24, 707 N.W.2d at 83-84 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
515. 2006 ND 20, 708 N.W.2d 884.
516. Perez, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d at 886.
517. Id. ¶ 1.
518. Id.
519. 2004 ND 12, 673 N.W.2d 257.
520. Perez, ¶ 5, 708 N.W.2d at 887 (quoting Green, ¶ 5, 673 N.W.2d at 260).
521. Id. (quoting Green, ¶ 5, 673 N.W.2d at 259-60).
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evidence will be construed most favorably to the opposing party.522 As
speculation will not defeat a motion for summary judgment, the court
requires the opposing party to provide “competent admissible evidence by
affidavit or other comparable means” that will show the court what
evidence raises an issue of material fact.523
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that a claim of negligence
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff,
the defendant breached his duty, and the defendant proximately caused the
plaintiff’s injury.524 As here, “[t]he driver of an automobile has a duty to
keep a proper lookout, and failure to discharge that duty is negligence.”525
If the evidence presented could result in only one reasonable conclusion by
a reasonable fact-finder, only a question of law exists and summary judgment may be appropriate.526
First, Perez argued that Nichols failed to keep a proper lookout.527
Perez stated that Nichols failed to survey the intersection before entering it,
and if he had properly surveyed the intersection, then Nichols would have
observed the oncoming car.528
Upon examining the facts in the light most favorable to Perez, the court
found that Nichols did not breach his duty to keep a proper lookout.529 The
court noted that Nichols had proceeded into the intersection on a green
light, following two other vehicles.530 Additionally, the court found that
Perez contradicted herself because she was unable to identify how Nichols
could have avoided the accident and she did not believe that Nichols caused
the accident.531 Furthermore, the court found important Nichols’ testimony,
in which he testified that he properly surveyed the intersection before
entering it.532 The court held that these facts, even in the most favorable
light for Perez, could not sustain a claim that Nichols had “breached his
duty to keep a proper lookout or that Nichols proximately caused Perez’s
injuries.”533
522. Id. (citing Hurt v. Freeland, 1999 ND 12, ¶ 7, 589 N.W.2d 551, 554).
523. Id. (citing Hurt, ¶ 8, 589 N.W.2d at 554; Ellingson v. Knudson, 498 N.W.2d 814, 818
(N.D. 1993)).
524. Id. ¶ 6 (citing Hurt, ¶ 11, 589 N.W.2d at 555 (quoting Diegel v. City of West Fargo, 546
N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1996))).
525. Id. (citing Kelmis v. Cardinal Petrol. Co., 156 N.W.2d 710, 715 (N.D. 1968)).
526. Id. ¶ 7 (citing Fast v. State, 2004 ND 111, ¶ 7, 680 N.W.2d 265, 268).
527. Id. ¶ 8.
528. Id.
529. Id. ¶ 9.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
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Next, Perez argued that Nichols had a duty to equip his van with safety
belts.534 Nichols and Perez both testified that safety belts were available in
the van, but Perez had chosen a bench seat that was not equipped with
safety belts.535 The court easily rejected Perez’s argument because Nichols’
van did contain seats with safety belts, and Nichols did not instruct Perez
where to sit.536 Because Perez raised no issues of material fact, the North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.537
In a special concurrence, Justice Maring remarked that the court is
without proper evidence to determine whether Nichols had an opportunity
to see the oncoming car that failed to yield the right-of-way and avoid the
collision regardless of his right of way.538 “It is the lack of that evidence
that justifies the summary judgment.”539

534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.

Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
Id. ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
Id. (Maring, J., concurring).

